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Abstract 
 
Objective. To examine the relationship between insurer market structure, health plan quality, and 
health insurance premiums in the Medicare Advantage (MA) program. 
 
Data Sources/Study Setting. Administrative data files from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, along with other secondary data sources. 
 
Study Design. Trends in MA market concentration from 2008-2017 are presented, alongside 
logistic and linear regression models examining MA plan quality and premiums as a function of 
insurer market structure for 2011. 
 
Data Collection/Extraction Methods. Data are publicly available. 
 
Principal Findings. MA plans that tend to operate in more concentrated MA markets have a 
higher predicted probability of receiving a high quality health plan rating. Operating in more 
concentrated MA markets was also found to be associated with higher premiums. Among plans 
that tend to operate in very concentrated MA markets, high quality MA plans were associated 
with premiums as much as two times higher than premiums associated with lower quality plans.   
 
Conclusions. Any policies directed at enhancing insurer competition should consider 
implications for health plan quality, which may be very different than the implications for 
enrollee premiums. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, proposed mergers and acquisitions among major U.S. health insurers have 
attracted widespread media attention. Insurers argue that consolidation can lead to lower prices 
through increased bargaining power in negotiations with providers.1 However, consumer 
advocates, politicians and policy experts alike have raised concerns that such mergers would 
adversely impact patients via higher cost sharing for care and a reduced focus on quality and 
innovation.2,3,4 
 
These concerns are not new; market concentration has long been a key issue for policymakers, 
with numerous examples of efforts to promote competition in U.S. health insurance markets. 
While the most prominent example may be the health insurance marketplaces introduced through 
the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), other legislation, such as the 2003 Medicare 
Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act, has included provisions designed to 
increase competition among health insurers. Arguments in favor of these policies often include 
rhetoric around the role of competition in fostering higher quality coverage.5 
 
Despite the ubiquity of arguments around competition and quality, few studies have assessed the 
impact of insurer market concentration on health plan quality. Prior work in this area has focused 
primarily on the association between insurer market concentration and prices for health care 
services. More recently, studies have examined the impact of insurer market concentration on 
health insurance premiums in the employer-sponsored market and in the health insurance 
marketplaces. However, less is known about market concentration in the Medicare Advantage 
(MA) program. This is important because mergers, such as those proposed between Anthem and 
Cigna, and Aetna and Humana in 2015, would potentially impact millions of elderly and disabled 
Medicare beneficiaries who receive their benefits through private plans. Initially just a small 
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portion of the Medicare program, more than 17.5 million beneficiaries are now enrolled in 
private MA plans, with over a third enrolled in plans through one of these four companies.6,7 
Given the increasingly prominent role of private plans in Medicare, understanding the impact of 
insurer market concentration on the cost and quality of MA coverage is essential for better 
policymaking.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the intersection between insurer market structure, health 
plan quality and health insurance premiums in the MA program, in order to begin to better 
understand the direct and indirect effects on patients of insurance company mergers and 
acquisitions, as well as policies aimed at increasing competition. This study has two specific 
aims: First, to assess the relationship between insurer market concentration and health plan 
quality in the MA program, and second, to assess whether health plan quality modifies the 
relationship between insurer market concentration and health insurance premiums in the MA 
program. 
 
Conceptual framework 
Health Plan Quality 
Health plan quality is a multidimensional construct that includes such diverse elements as 
enrollee satisfaction, health plan design, and quality of clinical care. As an intermediary between 
the patient and providers, insurers do not always have a direct influence on clinical quality. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of mechanisms through which insurers may have a substantial 
influence on the quality of care that enrollees receive. These mechanisms include the initial 
recruitment of high quality providers, as well as ongoing quality improvement efforts such as 
support for the adoption of clinical protocols and evidence-based medicine,8 provision of 
education for clinicians and/or enrollees,9 development of disease management programs,10 
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incentive programs for clinicians,11 incentive programs for enrollees,12 and structured cost 
sharing to encourage the use of high-value care and discourage the use of low-value care.13 
While it is critical to understand these specific mechanisms through which insurers may play a 
role in enhancing quality of clinical care, the focus here is broader: to examine the wider picture 
of health plan quality. Therefore, this study focuses on the reduced-form relationship between 
insurer market concentration and plan quality, as opposed to examining the specific mechanisms 
through which insurer market concentration may affect quality of care.  
 
The importance of health plan quality is reflected in the decision by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) to monitor and publish MA plan quality ratings. These quality ratings 
are visible to current and potential MA enrollees – as well as the general public – via a star rating 
system on the Medicare Plan Finder site.14 The visibility of these quality ratings theoretically 
provides an incentive to MA plans to improve the quality of care provided to patients. Further 
incentives were introduced via the ACA, which included provisions that modified MA payment 
policy such that benchmark payment rates and rebates would be based on plan quality from 
2012.15 Payment incentives such as these theoretically provide a strong incentive for insurers to 
focus on quality. 
 
Market Concentration and Health Plan Quality 
The relationship between plan quality and insurance market concentration is somewhat 
ambiguous. On one hand, increased market power would provide insurers with greater leverage 
in negotiations with providers, allowing insurers to implement quality improvement programs 
and incentivize providers to deliver higher quality care. Increased market power could also create 
greater savings via economies of scale, thus freeing up more funds with which to improve 
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quality. However, an alternative possibility is that with greater market share, insurers may reduce 
their emphasis on quality as consumers face limited plan choice.  
 
Importantly, an insurer’s leverage in negotiations with health care providers will also depend on 
the concentration of the local provider market, with insurers potentially facing more difficulty in 
negotiating quality standards and quality improvements in more concentrated provider markets 
as they are less able to exclude non-compliant or lower quality providers from their networks. In 
more competitive provider markets, providers may seek to distinguish themselves along both 
price and quality lines.  
 
Many of the above factors – visibility of quality ratings, payment incentives, insurer market 
power and provider market structure – likely impact the extent to which insurers focus on 
improving overall health plan quality. Given that increasing the competitiveness of insurance 
markets is an oft-stated policy priority, understanding whether, and to what extent, insurer 
market concentration is associated with health plan quality is critically important. 
 
Relevant Literature  
Few studies have examined the relationship between insurer market concentration and health 
plan quality, and fewer still assess this relationship in the context of the MA program. Most 
relevant to this study, a paper by Frakt, Pizer and Feldman examines the relationship between 
vertical MA plan-provider integration, premiums and plan quality in 2009.16 Their work suggests 
that a positive relationship exists between plan quality and premiums, with their findings 
indicating that one additional quality star was associated with $9 higher premiums among MA 
plans.  
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Studies from the mid-2000s by Scanlon et al. examine quality and competition among non-MA 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs).17,18 Their earlier findings suggest that competition 
between HMOs was not statistically significantly associated with clinical process quality, but 
was associated with enrollee satisfaction.17 Later work found no statistically significant 
association between HMO competition and plan quality.18  
 
Recent related literature examines market dynamics and dimensions of ‘benefit generosity’ in 
MA. In a 2018 study, Pelech examines pre-ACA policy changes impacting private fee-for-
service (PFFS) plans, finding that reductions in county-level plan offerings led to an increase in 
expected enrollee out-of-pocket spending and higher premiums for PFFS plans.19 A 2014 study 
by Cabral et al. exploits the introduction of MA payment floors in 2000, finding that, among 
plans receiving higher payments, greater market share was associated with lower ‘pass through’ 
of those payments to enrollees in the form of reduced premiums.20 McCarthy and Darden’s 2017 
study examines the impact of MA quality ratings on premiums and plan offerings for 2009-10, 
finding that contracts receiving higher star ratings raised their premiums in the subsequent year.21  
Taken together, these studies suggest predominantly positive relationships between market 
concentration and premiums, and between star ratings and premiums.  
 
More broadly, a number of studies have found insurer market concentration to be associated with 
lower provider prices.22,23,24 However, research is mixed regarding whether these lower prices 
translate into lower premiums for enrollees.25,26,27,28 This is important because quality 
improvement, which has a direct benefit to enrollees similar to reduced premiums, may therefore 
not improve with improved insurer bargaining power. 
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This study adds to the limited existing literature on plan quality and health insurer market 
concentration, incorporating more recent and comprehensive data on MA market concentration 
and quality than has been used in prior work. Moreover, by unpacking several complex factors – 
insurer market concentration, provider market concentration, overall quality, clinical quality, 
consumer satisfaction, MA premiums – via transparent analyses, this study aims to reflect on 
these theoretically ambiguous relationships and advance the policy conversation around quality 
and competition in MA. 
 
Data 
This study draws on a number of administrative data files from CMS, as well as data from the 
American Hospital Association (AHA), the Area Health Resources File (AHRF) and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS).  
 
MA market concentration was measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), with 
counties serving as the relevant geographic market and each insurance company’s county-level 
MA enrollment serving as the measure of market share. HHI ranges from near zero (a perfectly 
competitive market) to 10,000 (a monopoly) and is calculated by summing the squared market 
share for every firm in a market. While the total number of competing firms factors in to this 
calculation, this method lends greater weight to firms with a larger market share, e.g. a county 
with five insurers with equal market share of 20% would have an HHI of 2,000. However, if the 
same market had one dominant insurer with 80% market share and four insurers with a 5% share, 
HHI would equal 6,500. The Federal Trade Commission generally considers any market with an 
HHI above 2,500 to be highly concentrated.29 
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The county was chosen as the relevant geographic market for the HHI calculations as MA 
benchmark payment rates have historically been set at the county-level. Moreover, prior work 
has demonstrated that some insurers will selectively offer MA plans in certain counties and not 
others, in part due to differences in payments across counties.30 Because many plans within a 
county belong to the same parent insurer, and for the purposes of this study, the focus is on the 
dominance of the parent company in a given market, market share is measured at the parent 
company level. The CMS Monthly MA Enrollment by State/County/Contract file was used to 
identify county-level enrollment and the MA plan directory was used to identify the parent 
organization for each MA contract in order to aggregate enrollment to the parent company 
level.31,32  
 
CMS does not share enrollment data for contracts with fewer than 11 enrollees, so all contracts 
with 10 or fewer enrollees in a county were excluded. Counties in which all participating 
contracts had 10 or fewer enrollees were also excluded as it was not possible to calculate HHI for 
these counties. Also excluded were counties in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Mariana 
Islands, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. After these exclusions, HHI was 
calculated for 2,963 counties.  
 
MA quality star ratings are available at the contract level from the CMS MA Part C and D 
Quality Ratings files.33 Star ratings are based on measures gathered through the Healthcare 
Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems survey (CAHPS), CMS’ own Health Outcomes Survey, as well as other 
CMS administrative data sources.34 MA contracts are assessed on up to 55 individual quality 
measures.35 CMS aggregates the scores from each measure into five categories, with scores for 
each category translated into a 5-star scale: “Staying Healthy: Screening, Tests and Vaccines”, 
 10 
“Managing Chronic (Long Term) Conditions”, “Ratings of Health Plan Responsiveness and 
Care”, “Health Plan Members' Complaints and Appeals”, and “Health Plans’ Telephone 
Customer Service”. Scores from these categories are then used to calculate a summary score, 
also on a 5-star scale.35  
 
MA plan premium data was obtained from the CMS MA Landscape Source files.36 This study 
focuses on MA plans that include prescription drug benefits (MA-PD plans), as these plans 
represent the vast majority (88%) of MA plans on the market.37 As both insurers and prospective 
enrollees are likely to consider Part C (health care) and D (prescription drug) premiums together 
rather than either premium in isolation, the joint Part C/D premium was used in the analytical 
models. 
 
County-level MA benchmark payment rates were obtained from the CMS MA rate calculation 
data files.38 These rates, along with Medicare fee-for-service expenditure averages, were used to 
calculate the ratio of the county-level MA benchmark payment rate relative to average costs 
under fee-for-service Medicare in each county. The purpose of this was to serve as a measure 
approximating expected revenue relative to expected cost for MA plans in each county.  
 
Three measures of provider market concentration are included. Hospital market concentration 
was measured by calculating HHIs with geographic markets set at the core-based statistical area 
(CBSA) level and with market shares defined using each hospital’s total annual Medicare days. 
This measure was constructed using AHA Annual Survey data.39 Additional measures of 
provider concentration include the number of county-level hospital beds per 1,000 population, 
and number of county-level physicians per 1,000 population. Both variables are drawn from the 
AHRF.40  
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Additional market characteristics include the proportion of the county-level Medicare population 
in fair/poor self-rated health, the proportion of the county-level population over 65 years, and 
county-level median income. All were drawn from the CPS.41  
 
MA plan characteristics, including plan type (HMO, preferred provider organization (PPO), 
PFFS) and profit status were drawn from the CMS MA plan directory file.32  
 
 
Methods 
Descriptive analyses examining county-level MA market concentration from 2008-2017 are 
presented to illustrate trends over time. Next, analytical models examining MA plan quality and 
plan premiums as a function of market structure are presented. While CMS quality and premium 
data are available for 2012 onward, the analytical models focus on 2011, as CMS implemented a 
new payment methodology incorporating plan-level benchmark and rebate adjustments based on 
quality ratings beginning in 2012. Because the focus of this study is on understanding the 
relationship between market structure and plan quality, as opposed to the impact of this payment 
policy change on plan quality, 2011 represents the most recent “clean” year in which to examine 
the data.  
 
The unit of analysis for the analytical models is the plan level. Enrollment-weighted plan level 
means were calculated for all county-level variables. Quality ratings, MA plan characteristics 
(plan type, profit status), and MA plan premiums are consistent across counties within each 
plan’s service area, so these variables were not enrollment-weighted.  
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Plan Quality Analyses  
For the analyses examining plan quality, a logistic regression model (a) was estimated with the 
binary dependent variable High Quality representing the odds of plan p receiving a quality 
summary score of 4 stars or higher. This data is drawn from the 2013 MA Part C and D Quality 
Ratings datafiles,33 as these files report quality ratings that are based on data from prior years, 
including 2011.35 The model is specified as follows: 
 
(a) ln(High Qualitypy /1-High Qualitypy) = 0 + 1HHIpy-1 + 2HospitalHHIpy-1 + 3Provider 
Concentrationpy-1 + 4Benchmark Ratiopy + 5Marketpy-1 + 6PPOp + 7PFFSp + 8For 
Profitp + py 
 
where HHI is the one-year lagged enrollment-weighted mean county-level MA HHI for each 
plan. HospitalHHI is the lagged enrollment-weighted mean CBSA-level hospital HHI for each 
plan and Provider Concentration includes the lagged enrollment-weighted mean county-level 
physicians per 1,000 population for each plan, and the lagged enrollment-weighted mean county-
level hospital beds per 1,000 population for each plan. Benchmark Ratio is the enrollment-
weighted mean ratio of the county-level MA benchmark payment rate relative to county-level 
average costs under fee-for-service Medicare for each plan in 2011 (this is not lagged, as 
benchmark rates are known by insurers well in advance of the benefit year). Market includes the 
lagged enrollment-weighted mean CBSA-level log per capita income, the lagged enrollment-
weighted mean proportion of the population over 65, and the lagged enrollment-weighted mean 
proportion of the Medicare population in fair/poor health for each plan. PPO and PFFS are 
binary dummy variables for plan type (with HMO as the omitted category), and For Profit is a 
binary variable for profit status. Indices are MA plan p, year y, and pt is the error term. Robust 
standard errors were used to correct for potential clustering.  
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The model above was repeated twice more, using high quality ratings on clinical process 
measures and high quality ratings on consumer satisfaction measures as the dependent variables 
in order to assess whether there may be differences in the association between MA market 
concentration and quality by dimension of quality. Predicted probabilities calculations were used 
to further explore model results. 
 
Premium Analyses 
For the analyses examining MA plan premiums, an ordinary least squares linear regression 
model (b) was estimated, with the plan-level premium as the dependent variable. The model is 
specified as follows:  
 
(b) Premiumpy = 0 + 1HHIpy-1 + 2HospitalHHI py-1 + 3Provider Concentrationpy-1 + 
4Benchmark Ratiopy + 5Marketpy-1 + 6High Qualitypy + 7High Qualitypy*HHIpy-1 
+ 8HospitalHHIpy-1*HHIpy-1 + 9PPOp + 10PFFSp + 11For Profitp + py 
 
where all variables are defined as above in (a). Model (b) also includes interaction terms to 
explore whether the relationship between MA premiums and MA market concentration is 
modified by plan quality or hospital market concentration. All analyses were performed in Stata 
v.14.  
 
Results 
MA HHI Trends 
Over the last decade, the MA market has remained highly concentrated (Figure 1). Since 2011, 
over 90% of all county-level MA markets were found to have an HHI over 2,500. While the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission reports that the average Medicare beneficiary had 18 
MA plans to choose from in 2017,6 this analysis suggests that the vast majority of beneficiaries 
live in counties dominated by a small number of insurers. So, although beneficiaries may have a 
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great deal of choice among MA plans, they do not appear to have a great deal of choice among 
insurers. 
 
Plan Quality Analyses 
A total of 1,232 MA plans were included in the analyses. Table 1 presents the characteristics of 
these plans. Across all plans, the mean Part C/D premium was $46.09 (standard deviation [SD] 
$53.71). 42.1% of plans received a summary quality rating of 4 stars or higher, with 35% of 
plans receiving ratings of 4 stars or higher on clinical process measures of quality, and 36.6% of 
plans receiving ratings of 4 stars or higher on consumer satisfaction measures of quality. MA 
plans tended to operate in highly concentrated MA markets in 2011, with a mean MA HHI of 
3,275 (SD 1,058). MA plans tended to operate in highly concentrated hospital markets as well, 
with a mean hospital HHI of 3,608 (SD 1,931) across all plans. The majority of plans included in 
the analyses are HMOs (61.1%), with fewer PPOs (29.9%) and PFFS plans (9.0%). Nearly two-
thirds (66.5%) of plans are for-profit.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of logistic regression analyses examining the odds of an MA plan 
receiving a high-quality rating in 2011. MA market concentration is positively and statistically 
significantly associated with odds of a high-quality summary rating, though the magnitude of the 
association is negligible (odds ratio [OR] 1.02, 95% CI 1.01-1.03, p<.01). PPO plans, PFFS 
plans and for-profit plans were statistically significantly associated with lower odds of high 
quality summary ratings.  
 
The results of the models examining adjusted odds of high quality clinical process ratings, and 
adjusted odds of high quality consumer satisfaction ratings look relatively similar to the main 
model (Table 2, Columns 3-4). One notable difference is that MA market concentration was not 
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found to be statistically significantly associated with odds of high quality clinical process ratings 
(OR 1.01, 95% CI 0.99-1.02, p=.29), but was statistically significantly associated with high 
quality consumer satisfaction ratings (OR 1.02, 95% CI 1.00-1.03, p<.05). For both models, the 
magnitude of the association is small. 
 
Table 3 presents predicted probabilities calculations examining the probability of a plan 
receiving a high-quality summary rating at various levels of MA market concentration. Results 
suggest that plans that tend to operate in monopolistic MA markets (HHI=10,000), have a much 
higher predicted probability of receiving a high-quality summary rating (predicted probability 
[PP] 71.73, 95% CI 52.14-85.52) as compared to plans that tend to operate in very competitive 
(HHI=100) MA markets (PP 23.92, 95% CI 16.98-32.59). When the results are stratified by 
hospital market concentration, we find that plans that tend to operate in more competitive 
hospital markets (hospital HHI<2500), as well as highly competitive MA markets (HHI=100), 
generally have the lowest predicted probability of receiving a high-quality summary rating (PP 
19.63, 95% CI 12.14-30.14). In contrast, plans that tend to operate in more competitive hospital 
markets but that tend to also operate in monopolistic MA markets (HHI=10,000) have the 
highest predicted probability of receiving a high-quality summary rating (PP 82.89, 95% CI 
59.98-93.99).  
 
Premium Analyses 
Table 4 presents adjusted mean premium calculations based on the linear regression model 
outlined in equation (b). Results suggest that MA plan premiums are higher among plans that 
operate in more concentrated MA markets as compared to less concentrated MA markets 
(Column I). Operating in highly competitive MA markets (HHI=100) is associated with adjusted 
mean premiums of $31.25 (95% CI $22.49-$40.02), whereas operating in more highly 
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concentrated MA markets (HHI=7500) is associated with adjusted mean premiums of $65.54 
(95% CI $53.72-$77.36). Operating in monopolistic MA markets (HHI=10,000) is associated 
with adjusted mean premiums of $77.12 (95% CI $58.71-$95.54). 
 
Columns II-III of Table 4 stratify these results by plan quality. MA plan premiums appear to be 
more sensitive to MA market concentration among plans with higher quality ratings (Column III) 
than among plans with lower quality ratings (Column II). High quality plans operating in highly 
competitive MA markets (HHI=100) are associated with premiums of $29.98 (95% CI $14.89-
$45.07). However, high quality plans operating in highly concentrated MA markets (HHI=7500) 
are associated with premiums of $93.66 (95% CI $72.76-$114.56). As above, this suggests that 
less competitive MA markets are associated with higher premiums. This relationship persists, but 
is less pronounced, among lower quality plans. Lower quality plans operating in highly 
competitive MA markets (HHI=100) are associated with premiums of $32.09 (95% CI $22.42-
$41.76), whereas lower quality plans operating in highly concentrated MA markets (HHI=7500), 
are associated with premiums of $47.25 (95% CI $33.98-$60.51).  
 
Columns IV-V of Table 4 stratify the results by hospital market concentration. Again, operating 
in more concentrated MA markets is seen to be associated with higher premiums, and here this 
relationship holds regardless of level of hospital market concentration. However, operating both 
in more competitive hospital markets and more competitive MA markets is associated with lower 
premiums. Findings from Columns VI-IX, which stratify model results by both quality rating and 
hospital market concentration, suggest that higher quality plans operating in areas with highly 
concentrated MA markets are associated with higher premiums at either level of hospital market 
concentration (Columns VIII-IX, Table 4) as compared to premiums among lower quality plans 
operating in highly concentrated MA markets.  
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Discussion 
Private insurers are playing an increasingly important role in the Medicare program. In 2017, 
Medicare paid private insurers over $210 billion to cover the approximately one-third of 
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in private MA plans.42 Although the average Medicare 
beneficiary had as many as 18 plans to choose from in 2017, the MA market is dominated by a 
small number of firms: the findings presented here indicate that over 90% of county-level MA 
markets were highly concentrated in 2017. With just 10 health insurance companies accountable 
for 70% of all MA enrollment, understanding the implications of MA market concentration is 
critical.6  
 
The results of this study suggest that operating in more concentrated MA markets is associated 
with a much higher probability of receiving a high-quality rating, as compared to MA plans that 
tend to operate in more competitive MA markets. This seems to support the notion that greater 
market share enables insurers to negotiate higher quality care more effectively. MA plans 
operating in competitive hospital markets but that tend to also operate in highly concentrated MA 
markets were found to have the highest probability of receiving a high-quality summary rating. 
Thinking more broadly about these results, it is possible that MA plans may be able to more 
effectively recruit higher quality providers and negotiate higher quality care when they are the 
dominant insurer in an area with a more competitive provider market. 
 
In line with prior literature in this area,16 the premium analyses show that plans that tend to 
operate in more concentrated MA markets are associated with higher premiums as compared to 
those that tend to operate in competitive MA markets. However, the impact of insurer market 
concentration on premiums may be modified by MA plan quality. Notably, premiums appear to 
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be more sensitive to MA market concentration among high-quality plans at all levels of hospital 
market concentration. Among plans operating in very competitive MA markets, premiums 
associated with high-quality plans are similar to those of lower-quality plans. However, among 
plans operating in very concentrated MA markets, high-quality MA plans are associated with 
premiums as much as two times higher as compared to lower-quality plans.  
 
Limitations 
There are important limitations to this work. A chief limitation of this study is its cross-sectional 
design, which limits causal inference. To mitigate this issue, time-lagged variables are used, both 
for MA market and hospital market concentration, as well as for the county- and CBSA-level 
control variables. However, as the results only identify cross-sectional associations, it remains 
possible that an alternate interpretation of results – that high quality plans tend to locate in less 
competitive areas – is true. While longitudinal analyses would theoretically resolve some of 
these issues, shifts in CMS’ quality metrics over time and the potential for strategic plan 
consolidation by insurers suggests that longitudinal analyses may also be problematic. In 
addition, as is common to analyses of market concentration, omitted variable bias is a potential 
issue, as is endogeneity if MA plan quality or premiums influence MA market share. For these 
reasons, the results presented here should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Another limitation relates to the measurement of MA plan quality. In particular, it remains 
unclear whether CMS’ simplified star ratings fully reflect the multidimensional, complex 
construct of health plan quality more broadly. Indeed, plans with identical summary ratings may 
actually perform quite differently on various dimensions of quality. In addition, data on star 
ratings are only available at the contract level, not the individual plan level. The advantage to this 
is that MA contract-level data are more stable over time, as insurers merge individual MA plans 
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or modify benefit packages more frequently than contract mergers occur. However, enrollment-
weighted contract-level quality ratings data obscures any differences in quality at the individual 
plan-level, making it difficult to know whether a high-quality rating reflects high performance 
across all plans within a contract, or whether there is variable performance across plans. 
Importantly, additional sensitivity analyses using county-level models less subject to plan-level 
variation yielded similar results. It is worth noting that, following the introduction of quality 
bonus payments in 2012, strategic plan- and contract-level consolidation for the purpose of 
inflating star ratings has become an emergent concern.39 The potential gaming of quality ratings 
warrants further examination, and underscores the importance of CMS making more granular 
quality ratings data available to researchers.    
 
These analyses do not delve into differences between vertically-integrated and non-vertically 
integrated insurers, nor do they adjust for provider payment mechanisms, both of which may 
have implications for plan quality. While some of these market dynamics have been captured 
through the inclusion of plan type in the models (as PFFS plans and PPOs are likely to rely more 
heavily on fee-for-service reimbursement than HMOs, and HMOs may be more likely to be 
vertically-integrated), future work examining vertical integration and reimbursement methods in 
relation to plan quality and market share would be an important addition to the literature. Finally, 
these analyses primarily rely on data from 2011, due to the introduction of the new quality-
related MA benchmark bonus and rebate policies in 2012. Future studies should examine the 
impact of these payment policy changes on the relationship between competition and plan 
quality.  
 
Conclusion  
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This study has broad implications for policy, as the findings suggest that the relationship 
between insurer market concentration and health plan quality may be more nuanced than 
typically acknowledged in policy discussions. Policymakers often propose competition-
enhancing policies with the goal of improving consumer welfare. These findings, while 
preliminary, suggest that any policies directed at enhancing insurer competition should consider 
implications for health plan quality, which may be very different than the implications for 
enrollee premiums. Thus, pro-competition policies may require additional regulatory efforts to 
ensure plan quality at the local market level, necessitating coordination between federal and state 
actors. Such efforts would likely be bolstered by policies aimed at increasing transparency of 
health plan quality ratings. In the already highly concentrated MA market, the impact of 
insurance company mergers and acquisitions on the cost and quality of care must be carefully 
considered. 
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Figure 1. MA Market Concentration, 2008-2017 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure depicts the distribution of MA market concentration across counties within each year, 
using box plots. The boxes represent the interquartile range (the 25th to 75th percentile) of the values, with 
the line within each box representing the median. Dots represent outlier values. The Federal Trade 
Commission generally considers any market with an HHI above 2,500 to be highly concentrated. A 
horizontal line denotes where HHI equals 2,500.   
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
% Counties with 
MA HHI ≥ 2500
81.29% 76.13% 87.29% 92.37% 93.28% 93.23% 92.28% 92.32% 90.52% 90.95%
Mean MA HHI 4,586 4,155 4,407 4,880 5,006 5,051 4,971 4,878 4,839 4,989
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Table 1. MA Plan Characteristics1 
 
Dependent Variables Mean (SD) or %  
Premium 46.09 (53.71) 
% Zero premium plan 32.9% 
% High quality plan: Summary score 42.1% 
% High quality plan: Process measures2 35.4% 
% High quality plan: Satisfaction measures3 36.6% 
Independent Variables Mean (SD) or % 
Mean 2010 MA HHI4  3,274.5 (1,058.9) 
Mean 2010 Hospital HHI5 3,607.8 (1,931.0) 
Mean 2010 County-level Hospital beds per 1000 pop. 2.6 (1.0) 
Mean 2010 County-level MDs per 1000 pop. 2.3 (0.9) 
Mean MA benchmark payment rate relative to average FFS 
Medicare spending 
1.16 (0.09) 
Mean 2010 Log county-level population over 65 10.7 (1.2) 
Mean 2010 County median income 49,447 (9,150) 
Mean 2010 County-level proportion of Medicare beneficiaries in 
fair or poor health 
36.4 (8.7) 
% HMO plans 61.1% 
% PPO plans  29.9% 
% PFFS plans 9.0% 
% For-profit plans 66.5% 
n 1,232 
 
1 The unit of analysis is the MA plan level. In the above table, most variables have been enrollment-weighted and aggregated to the 
plan level to calculate the mean value across each plan’s service area. Premiums, plan quality, plan type (HMO, PPO, PFFS), and 
plan profit status are consistent across the service area so these variables were not enrollment-weighted. 
2 A high quality score on process measures is operationalized as a total score of 4 stars or higher for both of the two categories 
“Staying Healthy: Screening, Tests and Vaccines” and “Managing Chronic (Long Term) Conditions”.  
3 A high quality score on satisfaction measures is operationalized as a total score of 4 stars or higher for each of the three categories 
“Ratings of Health Plan Responsiveness and Care”, “Health Plan Members' Complaints and Appeals”, and “Health Plans’ Telephone 
Customer Service”.   
4 MA HHI is Medicare Advantage health insurance market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
with counties serving as the relevant geographic market and each insurance company’s county-level MA enrollment serving as the 
measure of market share. MA HHI was enrollment-weighted and aggregated to the plan level to calculate mean MA HHI across each 
plan’s service area. 
5 Hospital market concentration was measured by calculating HHIs with geographic markets set at the core-based statistical area 
(CBSA) level and with market shares defined using each hospital’s total annual Medicare days. As above, hospital HHI was 
enrollment-weighted and aggregated to the plan level to calculate mean hospital HHI across each plan’s service area.  
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Table 2. Logistic regression models examining adjusted odds of a high quality summary score (4 stars or 
higher) 
 
 
High Quality  
Summary Score 
High Quality Score: 
Process Measures1 
High Quality Score: 
Satisfaction Measures2 
 
Odds Ratio  
(95% CI) 
Odds Ratio  
(95% CI) 
Odds Ratio  
(95% CI) 
MA HHI/1003  
1.02 
(1.01-1.03)** 
1.01 
(0.99-1.02) 
1.02 
(1.00-1.03)* 
Hospital HHI/1004 
1.02 
(1.01-1.03)*** 
1.02 
(1.01-1.03)** 
1.02 
(1.01-1.02)** 
Hospital beds per 1000 pop. 
1.24 
(1.04-1.47)* 
1.24 
(1.05-1.48)* 
1.22 
(1.04-1.43)* 
MDs per 1000 pop. 
0.93 
(0.77-1.12) 
1.03 
(0.85-1.26) 
1.06 
(0.87-1.28) 
MA benchmark payment rate relative to 
average FFS Medicare spending 
6.27 
(1.43-27.6)* 
2.61 
(0.58-11.81) 
1.40 
(0.30-6.48) 
Log county-level population over 65 
1.30 
(1.08-1.56)** 
1.34 
(1.11-1.63)** 
0.80 
(0.67-0.96)* 
County median income (in 1,000s) 
1.01 
(0.99-1.02) 
1.02 
(0.99-1.04) 
0.99 
(0.98-1.01) 
County-level proportion of Medicare 
beneficiaries in fair or poor health 
0.99 
(0.98-1.00) 
0.98 
(0.97-0.99)* 
0.99 
(0.97-1.00) 
PPO plan 
0.51 
(0.37-0.71)*** 
0.49 
(0.35-0.69)** 
0.78 
(0.56-1.08) 
PFFS plan 
0.20 
(0.11-0.38)*** 
0.37 
(0.20-0.67)*** 
0.27 
(0.15-0.49)*** 
For-profit plan 
0.18 
(0.14-0.25)*** 
0.28 
(0.21-0.38)*** 
0.22 
(0.16-0.29)*** 
n 1,232 1,232 1,232 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.10 0.13 
*** p<.001 ** p<.01 *p<.05 
 
1 A high quality score on process measures is operationalized as a total score of 4 stars or higher for both of the two categories 
“Staying Healthy: Screening, Tests and Vaccines” and “Managing Chronic (Long Term) Conditions”. 
2 A high quality score on satisfaction measures is operationalized as a total score of 4 stars or higher for each of the three categories 
“Ratings of Health Plan Responsiveness and Care”, “Health Plan Members' Complaints and Appeals”, and “Health Plans’ Telephone 
Customer Service”.   
3 MA HHI is Medicare Advantage health insurance market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
with counties serving as the relevant geographic market and each parent insurance company’s county-level MA enrollment serving 
as the measure of market share. The unit of analysis is the MA plan level, so for these analyses, county MA HHI was enrollment-
weighted and aggregated to the plan level to calculate mean HHI across each plan’s service area. For the above analyses, MA HHI 
was divided by 100 to allow for easier interpretation of coefficients. 
4 Hospital market concentration was measured by calculating HHIs with geographic markets set at the core-based statistical area 
(CBSA) level and with market shares defined using each hospital’s total annual Medicare days. As above, CBSA-level hospital HHI 
was enrollment-weighted and aggregated to the plan level to calculate mean hospital HHI across each plan’s service area. For the 
above analyses, hospital HHI was divided by 100 to allow for easier interpretation of coefficients.  
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Table 3. Predicted probability of a high quality summary score (4 stars or higher)1 
 
 
All plans 
Concentrated Hospital 
Market (HHI≥2500)3 
Competitive Hospital 
Market (HHI<2500)3 
Mean MA Market 
Concentration2 
Predicted Probability  
(95% CI) 
Predicted Probability  
(95% CI) 
Predicted Probability  
(95% CI) 
MA HHI2 = 100 
23.92 
(16.98-32.59) 
25.78 
(17.97-35.51) 
19.63 
(12.14-30.14) 
MA HHI = 2500 
34.28 
(30.58-38.19) 
34.64 
(30.50-39.03) 
33.50 
(28.67-38.71) 
MA HHI = 5000 
46.92 
(40.91-53.01) 
44.72 
(38.86-50.73) 
51.72 
(42.90-60.44) 
MA HHI = 7500 
59.96 
(46.68-71.92) 
55.25 
(42.11-67.70) 
69.49 
(51.75-82.87) 
MA HHI = 10000 
71.73 
(52.14-85.52) 
65.33 
(44.93-81.32) 
82.89 
(59.98-93.99) 
 
1 Predicted probabilities calculations based on logistic regression models examining adjusted odds of receiving a high quality 
summary score. The models above include an interaction term for MA market concentration and hospital market 
concentration. Because one cannot directly interpret coefficients from interacted logistic models, results from the interacted 
regression models which form the basis for the above calculations are not presented. 
2 MA HHI is Medicare Advantage market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), with 
counties serving as the relevant geographic market and each insurance company’s county-level MA enrollment serving as the 
measure of market share. The unit of analysis is the MA plan level, so for the analyses that underpin the predicted 
probabilities presented above, HHI was enrollment-weighted and aggregated to the plan level to calculate mean HHI across 
each plan’s service area. 
3 Hospital market concentration was measured by calculating HHIs with geographic markets set at the core-based statistical 
area (CBSA) level and with market shares defined using each hospital’s total annual Medicare days. As above, hospital HHI 
was enrollment-weighted and aggregated to the plan level to calculate mean hospital HHI across each plan’s service area. The 
analyses then differentiated between plans that tend to operate in more concentrated hospital markets (hospital HHI ≥2500) 
and those that tend to operate in more competitive hospital markets (hospital HHI<2500). 
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Table 4. Adjusted Mean MA Plan Premiums by Degree of MA Market Concentration, Degree of Hospital Market Concentration and Plan Quality1  
 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
      
Lower Quality Plans  
(summary score <4 stars) 
High Quality Plans  
(summary score ≥4 Stars) 
Mean MA Market 
Concentration2 
All plans 
Lower quality 
plans 
(summary score 
<4 stars) 
High quality 
plans 
(summary score 
≥4 stars) 
Concentrated 
Hospital 
Market 
(HHI≥2500)3 
Competitive 
Hospital 
Market 
(HHI<2500)3 
Concentrated 
Hospital 
Market 
(HHI≥2500) 
Competitive 
Hospital Market 
(HHI<2500) 
Concentrated 
Hospital 
Market 
(HHI≥2500) 
Competitive 
Hospital 
Market 
(HHI<2500) 
MA HHI2 = 100 
$31.25 
(22.49-40.02) 
$32.09 
(22.42-41.76) 
$29.98 
(14.89-45.07) 
$39.22 
(29.30-49.15) 
$13.56 
(3.70-23.42) 
$40.64 
(30.30-50.97) 
$13.75 
(2.24-25.25) 
$37.11 
(20.96-53.26) 
$13.25 
(0.17-28.07) 
MA HHI = 2500 
$42.38 
(39.10-45.66) 
$37.01 
(33.41-40.60) 
$50.63 
(44.87-56.39) 
$48.17 
(44.18-52.17) 
$29.50 
(25.80-33.20) 
$43.24 
(38.95-47.53) 
$23.62 
(19.62-27.63) 
$55.55 
(49.37-61.74) 
$39.09 
(33.07-45.11) 
MA HHI = 5000 
$53.96 
(48.47-59.45) 
$42.13 
(35.92-48.33) 
$72.15 
(62.23-82.06) 
$57.50 
(51.97-63.02) 
$46.10 
(38.00-54.20) 
$45.95 
(40.16-51.74) 
$33.91 
(24.75-43.08) 
$74.76 
(64.47-85.06) 
$66.01 
(55.15-76.87) 
MA HHI = 7500 
$65.54 
(53.72-77.36) 
$47.25 
(33.98-60.51) 
$93.66 
(72.76-114.56) 
$66.82 
(54.67-78.98) 
$62.70 
(46.59-78.81) 
$48.67 
(36.09-61.24) 
$44.20 
(25.63-62.77) 
$93.98 
(72.07-115.88) 
$92.92 
(71.07-114.78) 
MA HHI = 10000 
$77.12 
(58.71-95.54) 
$52.37 
(31.75-72.98) 
$115.18 
(82.79-147.55) 
$76.15 
(56.97-95.32) 
$79.30 
(54.91-103.70) 
$51.38 
(31.57-71.18) 
$54.49 
(26.23-82.75) 
$113.19 
(79.14-147.23) 
$119.84 
(86.43-153.24) 
 
1 Adjusted mean premiums calculated in Stata v.14, applying the margins command to ordinary least squares linear regression models based on equation (b). Regression models 
include interactions between MA market concentration and hospital market concentration and MA market concentration and quality rating.  
2 MA HHI is Medicare Advantage health insurance market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), with counties serving as the relevant 
geographic market and each insurance company’s county-level MA enrollment serving as the measure of market share. The unit of analysis is the MA plan level, so for the 
analyses that underpin the predicted probabilities presented in this table, HHI was enrollment-weighted and aggregated to the plan level to calculate mean HHI across each 
plan’s service area.  
2 Hospital market concentration was measured by calculating HHIs with geographic markets set at the core-based statistical area (CBSA) level and with market shares defined 
using each hospital’s total annual Medicare days. As above, hospital HHI was enrollment-weighted and aggregated to the plan level to calculate mean hospital HHI across each 
plan’s service area. The analyses then differentiated between plans that tend to operate in more concentrated hospital markets (hospital HHI ≥2500) and those that tend to 
operate in more competitive hospital markets (hospital HHI<2500). 
 
